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II. TESTAMENTARY TRANSFERS
A. Gifts in Contemplation of Death Under § 2035
Often a decedent will have transferred property out of his estate
within a reasonably short period of time before his death. Should that
transfer occur within three years of the decedent's death § 2035 pro-
vides a rebuttable presumption that the transfer occurred in contem-
plation of death.' If the transfer is deemed to have been made in
contemplation of death, the full value of the property transferred as
of the decedent's death is to be included in the decedent's estate
under § 2035.2
In 1974 there were several decisions in which the contemplation
of death issue was litigated.3 However, in only one decision was the
estate able to rebut the § 2035 presumption. Estate of Mary E.
Sprague' provides an excellent example of the evidentiary subtleties
which can be crucial to the estate tax ramifications of an inter vivos
transfer.
In Sprague the decedent transferred her farm to her daughter five
months prior to her death. At the time of the transfer the decedent
was approximately ninety years old and had suffered several rather
severe physical ailments. Because of the relative proximity of the
transfer to the date of death, and the fact that the transferee was a
natural object of decedent's bounty, the government understandably
included the value of the farm in the estate.
The Tax Court discussed four distinct factors in holding that the
thought of death was not the "dominant motive"5 of the transfer.
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2035(b).
2Id., § 2035(a).
'In two 1974 decisions the presumption in § 2035 was not rebutted, Estate of
Elizabeth Moesch, 43 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1197 (1974) and Estate of Minnie Caplan,
43 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 177 (1974). See also American Trust and Sav. Bank v. United
States, 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 13,018, at 8859-59 (N.D. Iowa 1974) for a 1974 decision
wherein an excellent jury instruction regarding the contemplation of death issue is set
forth.
Life insurance policies present a particularly difficult problem with respect to §
2035. For a detailed analysis of this problem, see Graves and Finley, Irrevocable Term
Life Insurance Trusts and Gifts in Contemplation of Death Under § 2035, 32 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 855 (1975). See also the following 1974 decisions regarding the transfer
of life insurance policies within the three year presumptive period: Detroit Bank v.
United States, 369 F. Supp. 672 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Estate of Ross H. Compton, 43
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1381 (1974); Estate of Melvin Goldberger, 43 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
87 (1974).
443 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 692 (1974).
'United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102, 116, 117, 118, 119 (1931).
643 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 693.
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First, the court reasoned that although the decedent was indeed very
old, age in itself was not conclusive.7 Therefore, the court proceeded
to the second of the four criteria discussed. The decedent had a his-
tory of health problems pre-dating her death by about six years.8
Nevertheless, because there was no indication that the decedent
knew or perceived any of her illnesses to be fatal, the court reasoned
that no death motive was established.' A third critical factor which
the Sprague court examined was the amount of property which the
decedent retained until death. Because almost two thirds of her pos-
sessions had not been transferred, the Tax Court considered that the
testamentary character of the transfer in question was negligible.,'
The final and perhaps most persuasive factor was that the estate
presented evidence of a bona fide justification for the transfer. Evi-
dence was produced which indicated that the decedent had a desire
to relieve herself of the burdens of management of the farm when she
made the transfer." Because the court held that such a desire was one
associated with life rather than death motives 12 the transfer was
deemed not to have been made in contemplation of death.,'
The objective framework in which the evidentiary battle of § 2035
must be fought has been settled for years." In Sprague the estate
made a rigorous effort to present life motive evidence to the court and
that effort saved a considerable amount of estate taxes. The legacy
of Sprague is two-fold. First, the motive for a transfer of property with
substantial value must be documented carefully, especially as the
transferor grows older. Second, no matter how insurmountable the
task may seem, the § 2035 presumption can be rebutted provided a
good faith effort is made to collect and present coherently evidence
of motive that is inextricably tied to lifetime concerns.
71d. at 694, citing United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102, 118 (1931).
S43 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 693.
I Id. at 694. Two decisions were distinguished. The Tax Court held Chotin v.
United States, - F.2d - (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert. denied 414 U.S. 1130 (1974) inappos-
ite on the grounds that therein the decedent had actual knowledge of her fatal illness.
Estate of Robert W. Hite, Sr., 49 T.C. 580 (1968), was distinguished because the health
of the decedent was so poor that the court reasoned that he could not help but know
that the illness was fatal.
143 P-H Tax Ct. Men. at 695.
"Id. at 694-95.
"Id., citing John K. Broderick, Executor, 38 B.T.A. 1421 (1938).
"43 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 695.
"See Estate of Oliver Johnson, 10 T.C. 680 (1948).
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B. Retention of Life Estate Under § 2036
Section 2036(a) of the Internal Revenue Code,' like several other
provisions of the Code, 2 requires in certain instances that property
which has been transferred by a decedent during his lifetime be in-
cluded within a decedent's gross estate.3 Specifically, this section
dictates that transferred property be included in the decedent's gross
estate to the extent that the decedent retained or reserved at the time
of the transfer
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income
from, the property, or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person,
to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property
or the income therefrom.4
In order for the section to apply, however, the decedent must have
retained or reserved such an interest "for his life or any period not
ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which
in fact does not end before his death."5
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036(a).
2See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2035, 2037, 2038.
'"Gross estate" is generally defined in § 2033 of the Code.
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036(a).
Id. Section 2036(b) generally limits the application of § 2036(a) to transfers made
after March 3, 1931. Despite the length of time that has passed since that date,
litigation persists as to whether a particular transfer was completed prior to March 3,
1931 so as to escape taxation. In the 1974 decision Estate of Thomson v. Commissioner,
495 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1974), decedent transferred property in trust in 1928. The trust
instrument directed that income be accumulated and added to principal unless dece-
dent directed that it be distributed to either or both of the beneficiaries. No question
existed as to the taxpayer's right to exclude the principal of the trust from his gross
estate. The Government contended, however, that the taxpayer should have included
in his gross estate accumulations of income added to corpus after 1931. Relying on the
United States Supreme Court case of United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966),
the Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's holding in favor of the Government.
In O'Malley the Supreme Court held that transfer as used in § 2036(a) includes
past accumulations of income. Thus, where a decedent exercised a retained power to
distribute or accumulate income, accumulations were includible in the decedent's
gross estate. The Thompson court merely extended such an analysis to § 2036(b). In
so holding, however, the court appears not to have considered the legislative history
of § 2036(b). That section was enacted to alleviate any hardship that may havb re-
sulted as a consequence of a taxpayer's reliance on the law as it stood prior to Com-
missioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949). In particular, prior to Church, the
law was that reservation of a life estate prior to the enactment of the predecessor
of § 2036(a) in 1931 was not an interest requiring inclusion in one's gross estate. In
Church the Court took the opposite position, holding that reservation of a life estate
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(1) Retention of "Possession of"', "Enjoyment of", or "Right to
Income from" Property.
In considering the scope of the first subsection of § 2036(a)(1), it
is helpful to note that two difference types of retained life interests
are encompassed by the statutory language. The first includes trans-
fers in which the decedent reserves "the possession or enjoyment of
the property." The second class of life interest included within §
2036(a) (1) consists of transfers in which "the right to the income from
the property" is reserved by the decedent.' The courts have treated
before the 1931 enactment constituted an interest which was includible in one's gross
estate. To alleviate the hardship of one relying on the law as it existed pridr to the
Church decision, Congress enacted § 2036(b). Thus, it might be argued that the mean-
ing of the word transfer in § 2036(b) was to be construed differently than it is. in §
2036(a) in order to take into account congressional purpose in enacting the former.
'This second type of retained life estate under § 2036(a)(1), did not spawn much
significant litigation in 1974. In American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
33 CCH Tax Ct. Mei. % 32,803 at 1158 (1974), a husband instigated the creation of
two trusts, one with his wife as settlor which was the subject of the litigation, and one
in which he was the settlor. The assets transferred to the trust executed by his wife
consisted of securities originally acquired by the husband or other family members but
which had been registered in his wife's name for several years. Under the provisions of
this trust, the wife was entitled to the trust income for her life. Similarly, the trust
instrument executed by the husband provided that he should be entitled to its income.
In actual practice, however, the husband apparently took receipt of the trust assets
back from both trusts and continued to manage them as he had before their creation.
Additionally, the husband used the income from the two trusts' assets for family living
expenses.
Upon the wife's death her executor did not include the value of the trust under
which she was settlor and held a life estate, arguing that her deceased husband had
actually owned the securities prior to the trust's creation. The Tax Court, in a memo-
randum opinion, rejected this contention, recognizing the existence of a presumption
in favor of the Commissioner, and stressing the fact that the securities had been
recorded in the wife's name for almost twenty years prior to the creation of the trust.
Id. at 1167. Additionally, the Tax Court stressed that the trust assets in question had
not been included in the husband's estate for federal estate or state inheritance tax
purposes. These actions, the court found, "amount to admissions by the parties that
decedent was in fact the settlor. . . and the owner of the trust corpus before the trust
was established." Id. at 1166.
In State Bank v. United States, 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 13,015, at 85,801 (N.D.N.Y.
1974), decedent gave her son, a practicing attorney, her passbook and a withdrawal
slip for the amount of $24,900, instructing him to invest this amount in a mutual fund
trust for the benefit of all her children. Her son, however, fearing that the decedent
might not have sufficient remaining assets for herself, created a trust in which dece-
dent retained a right to the income and principal. The decedent allegedly became
aware of these unwanted retained powers when she subsequently received income from
the trust in 1963 and 1964. After her death in 1965, the estate asserted that upon
learning of her retained powers, decedent instructed-her son to amend the trust to
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the two varieties of reserved life interests independently
One of the issues relating to the first type of retained life interest
under § 2036(a) (1), reserving possession or enjoyment of the property,
is whether a decedent's continued occupancy of realty following its
transfer to his or her spouse constitutes an interest which requires
inclusion of the property in the decedent's gross estate.' The issue has
arisen because of the Internal Revenue Service's position,9 accepted
by courts,'" that the express reservation of a right to possession or
enjoyment of real property by the decedent is not necessary for §
2036(a)(1) to apply. It is sufficient for inclusion that at the time of
the transfer there existed an express or implied understanding be-
tween the decedent and the transferee that the interest or right to
possession or enjoyment of the property would be retained or later
conveyed to the transferor-decedent."1 Thus, the continued occu-
pancy of the transferred property by the decedent following the trans-
conform to her original intent. By way of affidavit, the decedent's son stated that he
had begun the process of amending the trust documents, but had not been able to
complete the revision prior to his mother's death due to his business and personal
affairs.
Plaintiff taxpayer asserted that the intent of the decedent to make an absolute
gift should prevail over the unauthorized form of the trust. However, the court dis-
missed this contention stressing that the existence of reserved powers in the trust
necessitated inclusion, regardless of intent or the exercise of powers. Id. at 85,806-
85,807. Similarly, the court summarily disposed of plaintiff's second contention, that
the delivery of the passbook and withdrawal slip constituted a completed gift. Id. at
85,807-85,808.
One final case relating to a reserved right to trust income was decided in 1974. In
Armata v. United States, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 62,998, at 84,423 (Ct. Cl. 1974), the
court held that a retained right to income continued in existence even though the
decedent had been adjudicated incompetent because the trustee had no discretion over
how much to pay to decedent. The trustee only had discretion as to the manner of
payment.
?See generally, C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. McCoRD, FEDERAL EsTATE & GiFr
TAXEs §§ 9.11, 9.12 (3d ed. 1974).
'The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that where a decedent continues to oc-
cupy property following its conveyance to someone other than his or her spouse, such
evidence by itself implies the existence of an agreement of retained enjoyment by the
donor. Rev. Rul. 70-155, 1970-1 CuM. BULL. 189. This position is consistent with the
court decisions confronting the issue. See e.g., Guynn v. United States, 71-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. 12,742, at 86,819 (4th Cir. 1971) (transfer to daughter); Estate of Emil Lin-
derme, Sr., 52 T.C. 305 (1969) (transfer to son).
'Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a) (1958).
"°E.G., Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. United States, 361 F.2d 662 (6th Cir. 1966);
Estate of Binkley v. United States, 358 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1966); Stephenson v. United
States, 238 F. Supp. 660 (W.D. Va. 1965); Estate of Allen D. Gutchess, 46 T.C. 554
(1966), acquiesced in, 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 2.
"Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a) (1958). See also cases cited in note 10, supra.
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fer to his or her spouse might be viewed under some circumstances
as an implied understanding 6f a right on the part of the decedent to
possess or enjoy the property, thereby triggering § 2036(a)(1). Prior
to 1974, such a view was consistently rejected by the courts. 2 In the
recent case of Estate of Francis M. Hendry, 13 however, the Tax Court
complicated the law in this area by holding that, under certain cir-
cumstances at least, an interspousal transfer might be included
within the scope of § 2036(a)(1).
Specifically, in Hendry, the decedent in 1948 conveyed to his wife
a parcel of realty on which he had previously operated a citrus and
cattle business. Neither at the time of the conveyance, nor at any
time thereafter, was there any written agreement between decedent
and his wife relating to continued use, enjoyment, or possession, or
income from, the property or relating to any right to determine who
would possess or enjoy the property or the income. However, dece-
dent's wife believed that the property in question belonged to both
her and the decedent prior and subsequent to the conveyance. Addi-
tionally, following the conveyance, decedent continued to operate the
property as a cattle and citrus farm just as he had previously. More-
over, in 1954, decedent and his family took up residence on the prop-
erty, where they lived until decedent's death. Based on these facts,
the Tax Court held that an implied agreement existed between the
decedent and his wife that the decedent would retain possession and
enjoyment of the property, requiring its inclusion in decedent's gross
estate pursuant to § 2036(a)(1).
In holding that the property in question was includible in dece-
dent's gross estate, the Tax Court held that where the circumstances
imply a pre-arranged understanding the burden of proof is on the
petitioner to establish that an implied understanding or arrangement
between the parties did not exist. 4 The Tax Court further held that
"2See e.g., Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. United States, 361 F.2d 662 (6th Cir.
1966); Estate of Binkley v. United States, 358 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1966); Estate of Allen
D. Gutchess, 46 T.C. 554 (1966), acquiesced in, 1967-1 CUM. BULL. 2; Stephenson v.
United States, 238 F. Supp. 660 (W.D. Va. 1965); Estate of Robert W. Wier, 17 T.C.
409 (1951), not acquiesced in, 1966-1 CuM. BULL. 4; Estate of Everett Otte, 41 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 317 (1972). See also Guynn v. United States, 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,742,
at 86,819 (4th Cir. 1971). The Internal Revenue Service itself acknowledged that con-
tinued occupancy by decedent following a transfer to his or her spouse does not by itself
constitute evidence of an agreement or understanding as to retained possession or
enjoyment by the donor. Rev. Rul. 70-155, 1970-1 CUM. BULL. 189.
"[1974 Transfer Binder] CCH TAx CT. REP. (62 T.C. , No. 92), at 3036 (1974).
"In support of the court's determination that the taxpayer bore the burden of proof
of establishing that no implied agreement existed, the court cited several cases dealing
with a transfer to non-spouse donees. As already noted, however, both the courts and
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decedent's estate failed to meet this burden, stressing the fact that
decedent continued to control the managerial aspects of the business
operated on the property, and emphasizing that the income from
such operations was deposited in decedent's personal checking ac-
count. Thus, the court distinguished cases holding that mere contin-
ued occupancy by a decedent with his spouse following a transfer of
the property to the spouse did not require inclusion in the decedent's
estate. 5
While the ultimate holding in Hendry appears to be correct, the
Tax Court's reasoning and approach is open to criticism. In particu-
lar, the court's finding of an implied agreement relating to the posses-
sion and enjoyment of the property is contradicted by the court's own
finding of fact. For an agreement to exist, even if it be no more than
an implied understanding, participation by two or more parties is
required.'" In the instant case, if any agreement existed, it existed
between decedent and his wife. But it was specifically found by the
court that decedent's wife believed that the property at all times
belonged to both the decedent and herself. Consequently, it is
stretching the concept of agreement to say that the wife in Hendry
implicitly agreed that her husband would retain rights of possession
and enjoyment when she was not even aware that he had relinquished
to her all legal rights in the property.
Even assuming that such an agreement did in fact exist, however,
the court's approach is still subject to criticism in that the court could
have reached the same result in a simpler manner. In Commissioner
v. Estate of Church, ' the United States Supreme Court set forth the
now well-established principle'8 that
the Internal Service had distinguished cases in which property has been transferred to
one's spouse, and cases in which the donees were persons other than the transferor's
spouse. See notes 8-11 and accompanying text, supra. Additionally, the court's action
requires the taxpayer to prove a negative proposition, a task which is not without its
difficulty especially in the present setting. See Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 361 F.2d 662 (6th Cir. 1966).
'"See cases cited at note 10, supra.
"Agreement is defined as
[a] coming or knitting together of minds; a coming together in opin-
ion or determination; the coming together in accord of two minds on
a given proposition; in law a concord of understanding and intention
tion between two or more parties with respect to the effect upon their
relative rights and duties, of certain past or future acts or perform-
ances ....
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 89 (4th ed. 1968).
'7335 U.S. 632 (1949).
"The principle noted in the text is itself cited in the court's opinion in Hendry for
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an estate tax cannot be avoided by any trust transfer except a
bona fide transfer in which the settlor, absolutely, unequivo-
cally, irrevocably, and without possible reservations, parts
with all of his title and all of his possession and all of his
enjoyment of the transferred property. After such a transfer
has been made, the settlor must be left with . . no right to
possess or to enjoy the property then or thereafter."9
In the instant case there can be no doubt that the transfer by dece-
dent to his spouse did not fulfill this requirement. As already noted,
the decedent continued to operate the cattle and citrus business on
the property just as he had done prior to the transfer. Additionally,
the income from such business was in no way shared with the wife,
but rather was deposited in decedent's personal account. Finally, the
wife was not even aware of the conveyance made by her husband.
Thus, it should be concluded, apart from the fact that the husband
later occupied a residence on the property with his family, that the
transfer was in no way bona fide and, therefore, was not sufficient to
take the property out of the decedent's gross estate.
To concentrate on the nature of the transfer, rather than on a
fictitious agreement between the deceased and the transferee-spouse,
would have the advantage of avoiding the difficult question of
whether under certain circumstances a deceased spouse's continued
occupancy of transferred property constitutes evidence of agreement
sufficient to require the property to be included in the deceased's
estate. It should be noted, however, that under Hendry's teaching,
where the property involved is income producing, the question will
continue to arise as to whether a deceased's continued occupancy of
transferred property might be viewed as an implied understanding
regarding the rights of possession and enjoyment, mandating inclu-
sion in the decedent's gross estate."0
support of the propsition that "[t]he mandate underlying the includibility of an
interest pursuant to section 2036(a)(1) is broad." [1974 Transfer Binder] CCH TAX
CT. REP. (62 T.C. , No. 92), at 3036, 3042 (1974).
19335 U.S. 632, 645 (1949) (emphasis added).
"As previously noted, the Hendry court recognized that mere co-occupancy by the
transferor with his or her spouse following transfer does not by itself establish the
existence of an implied understanding so as to require inclusion in decedent's gross
estate. See text accompanying note 14, supra. However, the court stated that Estate
of Allen D. Gutchess, 46 T.C. 554 (1966), acquiesced in, 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 2 (holding
that land transferred by a husband to a wife should be included in the husband's gross
estate because he continued to occupy the property with his wife until his death)
should be carefully confined to its narrow factual situation and that it would be
dangerous to abstract broad legal principles from it. [1974 Transfer Binder] CCH TAX
REP. (62 T.C. -, No. 92), at 3036, 3044 (1974).
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(2) Retention of the Right to "Designate" the "Enjoyment
of' or "Income from" Property.
Section 2036(a)(2) provides that transferred property2' in which
the decedent retained the right to control possession or enjoyment
shall be included in the decedent's gross estate.22 "Control of enjoy-
ment" has been construed rather broadly in the accompanying Treas-
ury Regulations and is said to include a "reserved power to designate
the . . . persons to receive the income from the transferred prop-
erty. 12 3 On the other hand, power over "possession" has generally
included the right to control the occupancy of non-income producing
property.
24
The apparent simplicity of this statutory provision is shattered by
its interaction with another provision of the Internal Revenue Code,
§ 2038. The latter section includes property in the decedent's gross
estate over which the decedent possessed at death a power to "alter,
amend, revoke, or terminate." 5 The provisions overlap in multitudi-
nous ways and form a hazardous path for the unwary.2 The operation
of both sections can be prevented, however, if the decedent's right to
designate or power to modify is limited by an "ascertainable external
standard." Developed in the Tax Court 2 and endorsed by the Second
Circuit, 8 the well established doctrine of external standards provides
that a right which is so qualified that it is enforceable in equity by
beneficiaries thereof "does not circumvent the obvious purpose of §
2038 to prevent transfers akin to testamentary dispositions from es-
caping taxation.
'29
The complex interaction between §§ 2036(a)(2) and 2038 and the
ascertainable standard doctrine provided the framework in which the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had to analyze the facts presented in
2'Just as under § 2036(a)(1), transferred property means property transferred dur-
ing the lifetime of the decedent. See text accompanying notes 1-3 supra.
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036(a)(2).





INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2038.
2 See C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. MCCORD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAXES
§ 9.22, at 231-34 (3d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as C. LOWNDS].
"Estate of Budlong, 7 T.C. 756 (1946).
2'Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947).
"Id. at 78 (dictum). In C. LOWNDES, the principle is stated thus: "a 'power' subject
to an ascertainable external standard is really not a power at all, but rather it is a
direction - imposing obligations rather than granting discretion." C. LOWNDES § 8.9,
at 157.
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a perplexing 1974 decision, Leopold v. United States.3" In Leopold,
the decedent created identical trusts for each of his two minor daugh-
ters under which he, as joint trustee, was to distribute all of the
income to them during their natural life, retaining the right in his sole
discretion to determine at what intervals it would be distributed.
However, the trust contained certain additional provisions applicable
during the minority of each beneficiary for "the support, education,
maintenance and general welfare of the said [minor]."3" Any accu-
mulated income was to be paid to each child upon her reaching the
age of twenty-one. Finally, the decedent had the power as trustee to
invade the corpus of each trust for the benefit of the minor beneficiary
when he decided it "necessary and proper" to do so."
The government contended that the entire corpus of the trust and
the accumulated income earned by the trust during the decedent's
lifetime should be included in the decedent's estate under §§
2036(a)(2) and 2038.11 The government reasoned that the decedent's
3175-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 13,053, at 8863-31 (1975). The Leopold decision was ren-
dered originally on September 9, 1974, but was subsequently revised and therefore
reported as of Jan. 2, 1975.
In another 1974 decision involving an allegedly ascertainable standard, the Tax
Court stated:
Words such as support, education, maintenance, care, necessity, ill-
ness and accident are generally regarded as providing ascertainable
standards; while words such as happiness, pleasure, desire, benefit,
best interest, and well being are generally not regarded as being suffi-
ciently definite so as to provide ascertainable standards.
Estate of Fred A. Cutter, P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. (43 P-H Tax Ct. Mem)
62.42 (1974) (emphasis added). In Cutter, the decedent had transferred assets to eight
inter vivos trusts for his grandchildren and retained the power to pay income if "neces-
sary" for the benefit of the beneficiaries, and to invade principal needed for their
"support and education." Id. at 215. The Tax Court found it "clear that the invasion
of the principal power is limited by an ascertainable standard." Id. at 216. With regard
to the decedent's power to pay trust income when "necessary" for the benefit of the
beneficiaries, however, the court held otherwise. The court determined that "the term
'benefit' suggest[ed] more than support, and [was] so overly broad as to be incapable
of being used as an ascertainable standard." Id. at 216. The Tax Court concluded that
the term "necessary" provided no further limitation to decedent's perogatives:
[T]he word "necessary" embodies no more than the decedent's gra-
tuitous directive to do what would have been required had the word
been omitted. The word neither adds nor detracts from what would
otherwise have been the decedent-trustee's discretionary power to dis-
tribute trust income "for the benefit of" each beneficiary.
Id. at 218.
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(1) discretionary powers to pay all of the principal over to an income
beneficiary during her lifetime and (2) discretionary right to accumu-
late or pay prior to majority and to determine when to pay the trust
income after majority constituted together a power to "alter" or "ter-
minate" the trust under § 2038.11 Additionally, the government con-
tended that these powers provided the decedent the right to designate
who should enjoy the benefits of the income under § 2036(a)(2). 35
The district court in Leopold concluded that the decedent, by
virtue of his power to invade the corpus when "necessary and pro-
per," retained enough control over the remainder interest to render
it includable under § 2038.11 However, because the decedent-trustee
had retained "no power to affect the beneficial enjoyment" of the
income interest, "except to the extent that such power was limited
by an ascertainable standard," exclusion of the life estate was al-
lowed.37 Additionally, the district court ruled that income accumu-
lated prior to the decedent's death should be excluded, apparently
because its distribution was not subject to any discretion."
On appeal, the estate concluded that the discretion held by the
decedent with respect to the remainder interest rendered its actuarial
value includable. Therefore, the issue before the Ninth Circuit was
the proper estate tax treatment of the income interest. Although the
appellate court agreed with the district court that the decedent's
power to distribute income was governed by an ascertainable stan-
dard39 and should to that extent be excluded from the decedent's
estate," the court also recognized that income could be generated by
Id.
3Id.
3'The findings and conclusions of the district court are located at 72-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. 12,837, at 84,716 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
1175-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 8863-33 (the Ninth Circuit discussing district court opin-
ion).
.Id.
Wvrlhe Ninth Circuit stated that because the trustee was authorized to make pay-
ments for the beneficiaries' "support, education, maintenance and welfare," the
trustee was required to maintain them in their accustomed way of life. Id. Since Old
Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 601 (lst Cir. 1970), mere authorization
has been deemed sufficient to create an enforceable right by the beneficiary, and
therefore the Leopold court's holding that an ascertainable standard existed is sound.
For an extended discussion of ascertainable standards see Part IV of this survey, infra.
"The court was proper in excluding the actuarial value of this income interest
since it was a present right to immediate enjoyment that the trustee could add to, but
could not alter. See, e.g., Walter v. United States, 341 F.2d 182 (6th Cir. 1965); Rev.
Rul. 70-513, 1970-2 CUM. BULL. 194. See also Du Charme's Estate v. Commissioner,
164 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1947).
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the trust in excess of the amount needed for "support and mainte-
nance" during the infancy of the beneficiaries. Since the decedent
had the discretion to pay over this income or accumulate it, the
Leopold court held that its value should be included in the decedent's
estate under § § 2036(a) (2) and 2038.41 However, the Ninth Circuit did
agree with the district court that the income already accumulated
should be excluded.2 Therefore, while the district court allowed the
estate to exclude the present value of an entire life estate in the
corpus of the trusts, the Ninth Circuit decreased the amount of these
exclusions by the actuarial value of income likely to be generated in
excess of the beneficiaries' objective needs before they reached major-
ity.
The holding of the Leopold court is of questionable validity. Spe-
cifically, the Ninth Circuit's division of the income interest of the
trusts into three separate parts is rather extraordinary and deserves
close scrutiny. The court created three categories: (1) income accu-
mulated by the time of the decedent's death; (2) future income neces-
sary for the objective needs of the beneficiaries; and (3) future income
in excess of these needs. The court's reasoning as to the effect of the
decedent's unbridled invasion powers on the inclusion of these three
income interests is unique. The decision serves only to further confuse
the perplexing question of the amount to be included in a decedent's
estate when the decedent retains the uncontrolled discretion to pay
the principal of a trust over to the income beneficiary and thereby
terminate the trust. 3
The essential problem created by retention of an unlimited power
by a grantor-trustee to invade corpus for the benefit of the income
beneficiary is whether the corresponding power to convert a present
but incomplete ownership right, the income interest, into a full own-
ership right, is sufficient to require inclusion of the value of the in-
come interest in the grantor-trustee's estate under § 2038.11 When the
Supreme Court considered the issue in Lober v. United States,45 it
"75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 8863-34, citing Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953).
475-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 8863-34.
"Authorities agree that the determination of the amount to be excluded as a result
of an unlimited power to invade in favor of the income beneficiary is a difficult one.
See C. LOWNDES, § 8.13, at 168; J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL GiFT AND ESTATE
TAXATON, § 25.44, at 738 (1959).
"Certainly the broad language of Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(a) (1958), as amended
T.D. 6600, 27 F.R. 4985 (May 29, 1962), would seem to require inclusion of the income
interest, since therein § 2038 is said to reach property subject to "any change" by virtue
of a power to "alter, amend, revoke, or terminate."
45346 U.S. 335 (1953).
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apparently reasoned that the power to terminate the trust by paying
the trust principal over to an income beneficiary was sufficient to
require inclusion of the trust property as a whole. In Lober, the
grantor-trustee could in his sole discretion accumulate or pay the
income of the trust to the beneficiaries until their majority." At
twenty-one any accumulated income was to be paid to the beneficiar-
ies and at twenty-five the principal itself was to be distributed.47 Most
importantly, however, the trustee could terminate the trust and pay
over the principal when he chose to do so.4"
The Supreme Court reasoned that by virtue of his power to accel-
erate the trust principal the decedent had sufficient indirect power
to alter each income beneficiary's interest to warrant its inclusion
along with the value of the remainder interest over which the direct
powers existed.49 In reaching this result, the Court rejected the argu-
ment that because the income beneficiaries had a vested interest that
could only be increased in size, their interest should be excluded from
the grantor's gross estate." The fact that their interest was subject
to mere change alone seemed sufficient to make § 2038 fully opera-
ble."
After Lober, therefore, it appeared that
any interest whose immediate enjoyment [could] be affected
by the decedent [was] taxable to his estate, even though his
power [was] limited to enlarging the transferee's interest in
the transferred property and . . . [therefore] the value of any
interest, [although] indefeasibly vested in the transferree,
[could] not [be] excluded from the amount taxable to his
estate.2
However, subsequent developments refined Lober3 and have indi-
cated that where at the time of the decedent's death the income
beneficiary is enjoying a "present right to immediate enjoyment" of
the income, the actuarial value of that interest will be excluded from







12C. LOWNDES, § 8.13, at 170.
"Walter v. United States, 341 F.2d 182 (6th Cir. 1965); Rev. Rul. 70-513, 1970-2
CUM. BULL. 194.
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and thereby enlarge the beneficiary's interest. 4 This interpretation of
Lober seems justified because the Supreme Court did indicate that
the income interest before it was not a "present right to immediate
enjoyment" and arguably based its decision to deny exclusion on that
fact. The government has to-date acquiesed in this refinement of
Lober.56 It would appear, therefore, that the absence of the "present
right to immediate enjoyment" of the income indeed was the crucial
part of the Lober decision and had become, prior to Leopold, the test
for determining whether or not the unlimited power to invade the
corpus would require total inclusion under §§ 2036(a)(2) and 2038.17
However, in Leopold the Ninth Circuit inconsistently applied this
test to determine whether the various income interests should be
included in the decedent's estate. The court correctly perceived that
the ascertainable standard language created, on behalf of the income
beneficiaries, a fixed, indefeasible income right that would appear to
be responsive to the "present and immediate" use criteria which even
the government had accepted as an exception to the total inclusion
doctrine of Lober.58 In addition, the refusal in Leopold to exclude that
part of the future income interest over which the decedent-trustee
had retained the discretion to either pay or accumulate seems proper,
since the practical enjoyment of the income was an uncertainty and
the decedent's power to convert that uncertain interest into a present
and complete ownership right was substantial."9 In fact, this income
interest was strikingly similar to the one in Lober which was included
in the decedent's estate because of the power to accelerate the princi-
pal.
The troublesome part of Leopold is that the court's decision to
exclude the income already accumulated from the decedent's estate
runs directly counter to the Lober doctrine. The Ninth Circuit ob-
served that the trustee had no discretion over the already accumu-
lated income at death because he had to distribute it to the benefici-
"In Walter v. United States, 341 F.2d 182 (6th Cir. 1965), the Sixth Circuit, after
discussing the Lober decision, reasoned that it followed from Lober that "in this case
[the trust] is exempt from the tax only to the extent that enjoyment was vested in
the [beneficiary] and was beyond the scope of the power retained .... " Id. at 186
(emphasis added). The Walter court apparently reasoned that the vesting of actual
enjoyment as opposed to mere legal title made its case different from that in Lober.
"Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335, 337 (1953).
"Rev. Rul. 70-513, 1970-2 CuM. BULL. 196.
5"his is the position expressed by Lowndes and Kramer, C. LOWNDES § 8.31, at
168-173.
"See note 20 supra.
5See and compare text accompanying notes 24-37 supra.
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ary at age twenty-one." Because the accumulated income did not
become part of the corpus of the trust and therefore become subject
to the "necessary and proper" powers of the trustee, the court rea-
soned that the accumulations should be excluded from the decedent's
estate."
The court's observation that the accumulations were separate
from corpus and, therefore, not subject to the same broad powers is
clearly sound.2 However, what the Ninth Circuit failed to deal with
is what the effect of the trustee's power to terminate the trust by
paying over the entire corpus to the income beneficiaries should have
been regarding inclusion of these accumulations.13 Under the Lober
doctrine, the decedent's power to convert the beneficiaries' vested
right to income in the future (the accumulated income) to a complete
ownership right by terminating the trust should have required inclu-
sion under § 2038, as the court had reasoned that it should with
respect to the future income stream that could be paid or accumu-
lated. Both were vested rights to future income that under Lober are
subject to inclusion by virtue of an unlimited power to accelerate.
The Leopold decision serves, therefore, to obfuscate once again an
issue which had begun to develop a degree of certainty. Before the
Ninth Circuit decision, because of the Lober decision and its subse-
quent refinements, the "amount-to-be-included" issue under §§
2036(a)(2) and 2038 was reasonably well settled. The value of the
entire trust property together with all accumulations as of the date
of the decedent's death was to be included, unless an income benefici-
ary was enjoying an income interest of "present and immediate enjoy-
ment." If such an income interest existed, the government and courts
have allowed the exclusion of its value as determined actuarialy. In
Leopold, two of the three income interests which the court recognized
were vested interests, but were not interests of "present and immedi-
ate" use. Despite this fact, the Ninth Circuit held in an ill-reasoned
"75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 8863-34.
"1d.
"2 The trust instrument clearly required that accumulations not become part of the
corpus of the trust. Id. at 8863-32.
'3Indeed, this is a distinct question because once a trustee pays over all the corpus
to the income beneficiary, the income and remainder interests of the trust merge. A.
ScoTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 341 (3d ed. 1967). Upon merger the beneficiary who holds
both equitable estates can compel the termination of the trust, if its continuance will
not be contrary to the settlor's intent. Id. There should be little question, therefore,
that the accumulated income could have potentially been distributed to the income
beneficiaries prior to their attaining age twenty-one, provided the parent or guardian
chose to terminate the trust once the corpus had been depleted by the trustee.
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opinion that one of these interests could be excluded despite the
decedent's unlimited power to pay over the corpus and effectively
terminate the trust. To this extent, therefore, the decision is unprece-
dented and should be viewed with caution.
C. Revocable Transfers Under § 2038
Under § 2038' of the Internal Revenue Code the value of a dece-
dent's gross estate includes the value of all transferred' property the
enjoyment of which the decedent has retained the right to "alter,
amend, revoke, or terminate."' The section is very broad in its appli-
cation and serves to overlap frequently with § 2036(a)(2) in requiring
inclusion of property for estate tax purposes.4 Among the develop-
ments in 1974 dealing specifically with § 20381 was a revenue ruling
which serves to clarify the applicability of § 2038 by providing an
unusually narrow view of the term "transfer."
In Revenue Ruling 74-5561 the IRS ruled that a wife who is treated
as having made a transfer for gift tax purposes under § 25131 will not
be deemed to have made a transfer for purposes of § 2038. The dece-
dent's husband had transferred some individually owned securities to
himself as custodian for the benefit of his minor daughter under the
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act.' He filed a gift tax return and in doing
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2038.
nTransferred property means property transferred during the lifetime of the dece-
dent. Compare INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 2035, 2036, 2037.
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2038. The power may be exerciseable either alone or in
conjunction with any other person. Id.
See Part II, B(2) of this survey and cases supra.
'In 1974 three decisions were rendered with respect to § 2038: Mathey v. United
States, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,975, at 84,342 (3d Cir. 1974) (decedent could name self
trustee and New York law permitted her to terminate; held included); Third Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. T 12,989, at 84,396 (M.D. Tenn. 1974)
(Tenn. law prohibited revocation of trust and thus no inclusion); Armata v. United
States, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,998, at 84,423 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (decedent's incompetence
no bar to operation of § 2038); Estate of Aris Carpousis, 43 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1064
(1974) (decedent as trustee held powers under § 2038; included).
An important Ninth Circuit decision, Leopold v. United States, 75-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. 13,053, at 88,633 (1975), which considered § 2038 as well as § 2036(a)(2), is
discussed in Part II, B(2) of this survey, supra.
'Rev. Rul 74-556, 1974 INT. REV. BULL. No. 46, at 8.
7INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2513. Should a wife consent under § 2513, a giftby the
husband will be deemed made one-half by the wife.
'UNIFORM GIr TO MrNoRs Acr, §§ 2, 3.
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so, with the decedent's consent, utilized § 2513 to have the gifts
treated as being made one-half by decedent. After serving as cus-
todian for a period, the husband resigned and the decedent succeeded
to the position. At her death she was still serving in this capacity.
Since a 1959 revenue ruling,9 § 2038 has required that when a
decedent who appoints himself custodian under the Uniform Gift to
Minors Act dies in that capacity, his estate shall include under § 2038
the value of the property he transferred under the Act. However, the
IRS chose not to treat the § 2513 gift tax transfer by the non-owner
of the property as a transfer under § 2038. In so choosing, the Govern-
ment relied on two propositions. First, reference was made to the fact
that § 2513 was enacted solely to equalize the gift tax treatment of
transfers by married donors in community and common law property
estates.'" Second, although the IRS conceded that §§ 2035-2038 were
intended to apply to property interests transferred by a decedent, the
property also must have been owned by the decedent before the trans-
fer." Since a federal district court 2 had made these same observa-
tions in holding that a husband's estate should bear the burden for
the full value of property transferred in contemplation of death de-
spite § 2513 treatment for gift tax purposes, the Government appar-
ently decided that its decision to adopt a narrow definition of transfer
was sound.
A literal reading of Revenue Ruling 74-556 would make the IRS's
statements applicable to §§ 2035-2038. The Government's position
will obviously serve to encourage naming the parent who had no
ownership rights before the transfer as custodian under the Uniform
Gifts to Minors Act. The funding parent can, therefore, retain de
facto control despite the absence of legal control of the assets. An
additional effect of this ruling, however, is to facilitate the funding
of the inter vivos trust, a frequently used estate planning device. 3
Utilization of § 2513 to split the gifts that fund the trust will not raise
any potential inclusion problems under § 2036(a)(1) should the non-
'Rev. Rul. 357, 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 212.
"Rev. Rul. 74-556, 1974 INT. REV. BULL. No. 46, at 9.
"Id.
"English v. United States, 284 F. Supp. 256 (N.D. Fla. 1968).
' The inter vivos trust is used to transfer a certain percentage of an individual's
property out of his estate to reduce estate taxation. Generally, the trust contains
insurance policies or is funded during the life of the decedent with liquid assets. The
trust usually provides the decedent's wife with a life estate only, so as to provide
financial benefits and yet avoid estate taxation under § 2041 at her death. Such a trust
preserves as much of the trust property as possible for the children of the decedent and
spouse by avoiding estate taxation at both the decedent's and the wife's death.
